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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal presents a significant constitutional question 
implicating an aspect of Pennsylvania's recent amendment 
to its public assistance benefits legislation. Pennsylvania 
made the change during a recent wave of federal and state 
welfare reform legislation which swept the nation calling for 
a reduction in overall welfare expenditures. Specifically, we 
must decide the constitutionality of S 9(5)(ii) of 
Pennsylvania's Act 35 of 1996. See Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 62, 
S 432(5)(ii). It mandates that an eligible family arriving in 
Pennsylvania from another state shall, during itsfirst 
twelve months of bona fide residence, receive as cash 
benefits the lesser of: (1) the benefit level available to 
similarly situated Pennsylvania residents of twelve months 
or more, or (2) the benefit level the family would have been 
eligible to receive in their prior state had they not moved to 
Pennsylvania. 
 
In 1997, several months after the passage of this 
legislation, Maria and Edwin Maldonado and their six 
minor children migrated to Pennsylvania from Puerto Rico. 
They became eligible for public assistance benefits but were 
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informed that the cash benefits allowance available to them 
would be substantially lower than the benefits provided to 
similarly situated long-term Pennsylvania residents.1 
 
Shortly thereafter, the Maldonados and several 
organizations that represent their interests (collectively, the 
"Maldonados"), instituted a class action against Feather O. 
Houstoun, Pennsylvania's Secretary of Public Welfare, and 
Don Jose Stovall, Executive Director of the Philadelphia 
Board of Assistance, both in their official capacities 
(collectively, the "Commonwealth"), in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The 
Maldonados sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983, seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that 
Pennsylvania's two-tier welfare scheme violates their 
constitutional rights to travel, to equal protection, and to 
non-discriminatory treatment under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. The district court held that the scheme 
did not appear to be supported by a rational basis, and 
thus likely violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause. Therefore, the court preliminarily 
enjoined enforcement of the two-tier scheme and certified 
the class, with the Maldonados as class representatives. 
The Commonwealth timely appealed the injunction. We 
affirm, although our analysis differs. 
 
I. 
 
The relevant facts of this case are for the most part 
undisputed. In May 1996, after several attempts to pass 
similar measures failed throughout the early 1990s, 
Pennsylvania, as part of the state's broad-scale welfare 
reform, enacted Section 9(5)(ii), governing public assistance 
benefits to eligible families that have resided in 
Pennsylvania for less than one year. Section 9(5)(ii) provides 
that during the first twelve months of residence in 
Pennsylvania, an eligible family's cash assistance benefits 
are limited to the lesser of (1) the benefit level that family 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Pennsylvanians with a twelve month residence were eligible for cash 
benefits of $836 but the Maldonado family, because of their less than a 
twelve month residence, was eligible for cash benfits of only $304 per 
month, the amount they would have been allowed in Puerto Rico. 
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would have received in its prior state of residence, or (2) the 
benefit level available to otherwise similarly situated long- 
term Pennsylvania residents.2 Because Pennsylvania grants 
larger cash benefits than 40 other states, under this two- 
tier scheme, a typical eligible family moving to Pennsylvania 
would lose anywhere from over 60%, to as little as 2%, of 
their cash benefits for the first twelve months that they 
reside in the state. 
 
Pennsylvania's legislation received considerable 
reassurance when several months later, in August 1996, 
Congress passed landmark welfare reform legislation known 
as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("PRWORA"), 42 U.S.C. SS 601, et 
seq. The PRWORA dramatically changed the climate for 
welfare programs in this country and encouraged states to 
adopt restrictive cash benefit programs of the type 
contained in Pennsylvania's Act 35 for those relocating from 
another state. Among other things, the PRWORA changed 
the basic funding format for state Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families ("TANF ")3 plans to awards of block grants, 
expressly terminating the prior program's entitlement 
nature. Especially relevant to this appeal is Section 604(c) 
of the PRWORA, which explicitly authorized two-tier cash 
benefits provisions like that enacted by Pennsylvania. 
Section 604(c) authorized states to treat new residents 
differently than longer-term residents. 
 
Prior to May 1997, Plaintiff Edwin Maldonado worked as 
a mechanic in Puerto Rico and supported his family with 
his salary plus government-provided nutritional and 
medical assistance. In May 1997, Maldonado's job ended. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Section 9(5)(ii), in its entirety, reads as follows: 
 
       Cash assistance for applicants and recipients of aid to families 
with 
       dependent children who have resided in this Commonwealth for less 
       than twelve months shall not exceed the lesser of the maximum 
       assistance payment that would have been received from the 
       applicant's or recipient's state of prior residence or the maximum 
       assistance payment available to the applicant or recipient in this 
       Commonwealth. 
 
3. TANF replaced the former federal welfare program popularly known as 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"). 
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He and his wife both had health problems, and therefore in 
May 1997, they and their six children moved from Puerto 
Rico to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where Mr. Maldonado 
was born and spent part of his childhood, to seek better 
health care. 
 
Shortly after establishing residence in Pennsylvania, the 
Maldonados applied for TANF benefits. The Pennsylvania 
Department of Public Welfare ("DPW") approved their 
application and also certified that both Mr. and Mrs. 
Maldonado temporarily were unable to work. Under 
Pennsylvania's revised welfare scheme, the Maldonados 
qualified for monthly cash benefits of $304, the amount 
they would have received in their prior place of residence, 
Puerto Rico, $720 in food stamps and medical benefits paid 
by the state of $1,483.60, plus a one-time grant of $213 to 
defray job-search expenses.4 Had the Maldonados been 
residents of Pennsylvania for at least twelve months, they 
would have been eligible for cash benefits of $836 per 
month instead of the $304 in benefits that they actually 
received, a reduction of almost 64%. 
 
As a result of the DPW's benefits decision, the 
Maldonados sued the Commonwealth on June 19, 1997, 
seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and 
declaratory and injunctive relief. They claimed that 
Pennsylvania's two-tier durational residency structure 
violated their fundamental right to travel, their rights under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and their rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
After denying the plaintiffs' motion for a TRO, the court 
held a two-day hearing on the application for a preliminary 
injunction. On October 6, 1997, after considering the 
memoranda, transcripts, exhibits, and other evidence 
contained in the sizeable and well-developed record, the 
district court certified the class and preliminarily enjoined 
enforcement of Pennsylvania's two-tier durational residency 
requirement. The court, applying rational basis Equal 
Protection analysis, held the law irrational. It found that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Maldonados returned the $213 grant as both were certified 
temporarily unable to work. 
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the class members were likely to succeed on the merits of 
their constitutional claim that the class would suffer 
irreparable harm absent the injunction, rejected the 
Commonwealth's fiscal harm arguments, and found that 
the public interest would be best served by granting the 
injunction.5 
 
The Commonwealth timely appealed. The district court 
placed the action in civil suspense pending resolution of 
this appeal.6 
 
II. 
 
On appeal, when considering the district court's grant of 
a preliminary injunction, we review the court's legal 
conclusions de novo, its findings of fact for clear error, and 
its ultimate decision to grant or deny the preliminary 
injunction for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Anderson v. 
Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 159 (3d Cir. 1997); New Jersey Hosp. 
Ass'n v. Waldman, 73 F.3d 509, 512 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Because this appeal presents solely legal questions 
pertaining to the constitutionality of Section 9(5)(ii) of 
Pennsylvania's welfare act, our review is plenary. 
Ordinarily, limited review is appropriate at the preliminary 
injunction stage of a constitutional challenge to a state 
statute, but since the issue is legal and the facts are well 
established, we "need not abstain from addressing the 
constitutional issue." Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obst. and Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 756 (1986). 
 
A. 
 
The Commonwealth succinctly frames the appellate issue 
in these words: "Whether Pennsylvania violates the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. On October 30, 1997, the court granted in part and denied in part the 
Maldonados' motion to amend their complaint to include two additional 
families as plaintiffs and class representatives, allowing one family--the 
Ortizes--to join and denying the other. 
 
6. The district court had jurisdiction over this civil rights action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1343. This Court has jurisdiction 
over the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1). 
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Constitution by providing that, for one year after their 
arrival in Pennsylvania, applicants for certain welfare 
benefits may receive only the amount they would have 
received in their state of prior residence." Thus, we are 
called upon only to determine the constitutionality of the 
state statute; the federal statute, PRWORA, is not before us. 
From a procedural perspective, the district court decided 
the case on the Maldonados' motion for a preliminary 
injunction. A district court should grant a preliminary 
injunction only if (1) the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the 
merits; (2) denial will result in irreparable harm to the 
plaintiff; (3) granting the injunction will not result in 
irreparable harm to the defendant; and (4) granting the 
injunction is in the public interest. See Merchant & Evans, 
Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., Inc., 963 F.2d 628, 632- 
33 (3d Cir. 1992). After weighing these factors, and 
although the district court found that all four weighed in 
the Maldonados' favor, it relied almost exclusively on the 
first, the likelihood of success on the merits. Thus, if the 
court incorrectly determined that the Maldonados were 
likely to succeed on the legal merits of their claim, it erred 
in granting the injunction. Because the Commonwealth 
limits its appeal to the merits issue, we need only address 
the propriety of the district court's legal conclusions. 
 
B. 
 
Under the Equal Protection clause, no state shall "deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, S1. Pennsylvania's two- 
tier act warrants equal protection analysis because it 
classifies bona fide residents of the state into two groups 
when determining welfare benefits. In determining the 
extent of cash welfare benefits, Pennsylvania created two 
classes of indigent residents indistinguishable from each 
other except that one is composed of residents who have 
resided in the state a year or more, and the other of 
residents who have resided in the state less than a year. 
 
Even though a state has created a classification, not all 
classifications are per se unconstitutional or automatically 
subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. If Pennsylvania's 
durational residency classification " `neither burdens a 
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fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will 
uphold [it] so long as it bears a rational relation to some 
legitimate end.' " See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 
(1997) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)); 
see also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 17 (1973). However, if the two-tier scheme is drawn 
on suspect lines or does sufficiently burden a fundamental 
right, it is subject to strict scrutiny and will pass 
constitutional muster only if it is narrowly tailored to serve 
a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 
405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618, 634 (1969). 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the district court 
correctly held that Pennsylvania's two-tier durational 
residence requirement does not penalize the plaintiffs' 
fundamental right to travel or their right to equal 
protection, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny. 
Instead, it argues that the court erred in holding that the 
scheme was unconstitutional under rational basis review 
when it found that it was not related to a legitimate 
governmental interest. The Commonwealth contends that 
the statute is rationally related to furthering the 
Commonwealth's legitimate interest in fostering the self- 
sufficiency and work ethic of its citizens, including its 
newest citizens. By leaving recent interstate migrants with 
the same benefit level as they were in their former place of 
residence, the statute encourages them to seek work, rather 
than increased benefits. The Maldonados, not surprisingly, 
argue that although the court was correct in holding that 
the statute did not pass rational basis review, that the two- 
tier scheme penalizes the plaintiffs' fundamental right to 
travel, and thus should be subject to strict scrutiny. 
Neither party claims that the scheme classifies on suspect 
lines. 
 
C. 
 
The constitutional right to travel is not contained in the 
text of the Constitution, and a majority of the Supreme 
Court of the United States has never agreed upon its 
textual source. Analytically, the Court has recognized that 
the historical foundation upon which this Republic was 
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structured was that we are all citizens of the United States, 
one people, and, as such, we "must have the right to pass 
and repass through every part of [the country] without 
interruption, as freely as in our own States." See The 
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849). This right to 
pass freely from one state to another was one of the 
attractive features that persuaded the colonists to unite 
into a nation. The Supreme Court repeatedly and 
consistently has recognized a fundamental right to 
interstate travel, see e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 
745 (1966); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867); 
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, and that inextricably 
implicated therein is the right to migrate to and settle in 
another state. See, e.g., Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 417- 
19 (1981); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 
250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338; Shapiro, 
394 U.S. 618. 
 
Regrettably, however, the law with respect to the 
constitutional implications of the right to travel is unsettled 
and in need of clarification. The Court has at times 
subjected durational residence laws that impinge on the 
right to travel to strict scrutiny, see Maricopa County, 415 
U.S. 250; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330; Shapiro, 394 
U.S. 618, and at other times to what appears to be some 
form of a heightened rational basis test.7  Furthermore, 
although never formally recognized by the Court, we have 
previously noted that Shapiro and its progeny arguably 
were analyzed, at least in part, as if the classifications at 
issue were somewhat suspect, in that they "penalized a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986); 
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Zobel v. 
Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); see also Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 
983, 988-94 (D. Kan. 1985) (discussing the Supreme Court's use of 
"heightened rational basis scrutiny"); Alvarez v. Chavez, 886 P.2d 461, 
466-67 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Laurence H. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law, S 16-3 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the "new, more 
penetrating character" of the rational basis test, which he lables 
"covertly 
heightened scrutiny"); Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with 
Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 Ind. L.J. 779, 787-92 
(1987) (discussing "rational basis with bite in the right-to-travel 
context"). 
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group of people on the basis of their having exercised a 
constitutionally protected right to travel." See Lutz v. City of 
York, Pennsylvania, 899 F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir. 1990); see 
also Thomas R. McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions-- 
Fundamental Right to Travel or "Newcomers" as a Suspect 
Class?, 28 Vand. L. Rev. 987 (1975); Todd Zubler, The Right 
to Migrate and Welfare Reform: Time for Shapiro v. 
Thompson to Take a Hike, 31 Val. U. L. Rev. 893, 904-05 
(1997). 
 
In the seminal right to travel case of Shapiro, 394 U.S. 
618, the Court subjected to strict scrutiny several state 
laws that created one-year durational residence 
requirements as a prerequisite to eligibility for any welfare 
benefits. In construing a strikingly similar Pennsylvania 
statute, the Court in Shapiro expressly held that "any 
classification which serves to penalize the exercise of th[e] 
right [to travel], unless shown to be necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Id. 
at 634. The Shapiro Court reasoned that the one-year 
residence requirement imposed on recent migrants as a 
condition of welfare eligibility, which resulted in a complete 
denial of benefits for those persons residing in the state for 
less than one year, was unconstitutional, because it 
discriminated based solely on length of residency in the 
state and thus unconstitutionally burdened the plaintiffs' 
fundamental right to interstate travel and migration. 
 
Five years later, in Maricopa County, the Court, applying 
Shapiro, similarly subjected to strict scrutiny an Arizona 
law that required one-year residency in a county as a 
prerequisite to receiving free nonemergency hospital or 
medical care. 415 U.S. 250. The Maricopa County Court 
acknowledged that "any durational residence requirement 
impinges to some extent on the right to travel" and thus not 
all durational residency requirements are per se 
unconstitutional. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 256. The 
Court further stressed, however, that "the right of interstate 
travel must be seen as insuring new residents the same 
right to vital government benefits and privileges in the 
States to which they migrate as are enjoyed by other 
residents." Id. at 261. Thus, because it found that "medical 
care is as much `a basic necessity of life' to an indigent as 
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[the] welfare assistance" at issue in Shapiro, and that the 
classification penalized those persons who had"exercised 
their constitutional right of interstate migration,[the 
statute] must be justified by a compelling state interest." Id. 
at 258-59 (citation omitted). The Court then struck down 
the law, finding that the Arizona statute created"an 
`invidious classification' that impinges on the right of 
interstate travel by denying newcomers `basic necessities of 
life,' " and was not supported by compelling justifications or 
narrowly drawn. 415 U.S. at 269. 
 
Since Shapiro and Maricopa County, a majority of the 
Court has never subjected a durational residency 
requirement to strict scrutiny. Instead, the Court 
sometimes employs some form of rational basis review, and, 
occasionally, analyzes such laws without even implicating 
the fundamental right to travel. See, e.g., Attorney General 
of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (four of the 
justices applied strict scrutiny in an opinion which did not 
command a majority); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 
472 U.S. 612 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). 
This tendency, however, does not establish that rational 
basis is now the appropriate test when evaluating 
durational residency requirements as applied to welfare 
benefits. The Court in those cases merely employed its 
version of rational basis analysis because the challenged 
laws could not even survive rational basis review. Thus, the 
Court found it unnecessary to subject the laws to 
heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 904 
(explaining that because the "contested classifications [in 
Zobel and Hooper] did not survive even rational basis, [the 
Court] had no occasion to inquire whether enhanced 
scrutiny was appropriate"). The holdings of Shapiro and 
Maricopa County subjecting durational residency 
requirements that impinge on the right to travel to strict 
scrutiny, however, have never been overturned and thus 
are binding precedent to which we adhere in deciding this 
factually and legally similar case. 
 
In deciding whether a durational residency requirement 
sufficiently impinges upon the right to travel or migrate to 
trigger strict scrutiny, the Court looks to see whether the 
challenged law's "primary objective" is to impede interstate 
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travel; whether it "penalize[s] the exercise of that right;" or 
whether it "actually deters such travel." Soto-Lopez, 476 
U.S. at 903 (plurality opinion) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted); see also Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 628-34. 
Here, relying on the legislature's express intent "to promote 
the self-sufficiency of all the people of the Commonwealth," 
Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 62, S 401(a), the district court, in a very 
thoroughly drafted opinion, agreed with the Commonwealth 
that the statute's primary objective was not to deter 
interstate travel and migration. The court also found that 
the plaintiffs offered no conclusive evidence that the 
durational residency requirement actually deters the right. 
Even accepting the district court's conclusions of law that 
travel deterrence was not the statute's primary objective 
and the court's finding that the plaintiffs' failure to 
establish that the duration requirement actually deterred, 
we are still left with the formidable task of determining 
whether having exercised the Constitutional right to travel, 
the plaintiffs were penalized because of the duration of 
their residence. 
 
The district court ultimately employed rational basis 
review because it found that the Maldonados could not 
"demonstrate that Section 9(5)(ii)'s durational residence 
requirement results in a `penalty' on the right to interstate 
migration." The court distinguished this case from Shapiro 
on the ground that scheme at issue in Shapiro resulted in 
a total deprivation of welfare benefits needed to obtain 
"life's basic necessities," whereas here the Pennsylvania 
statute amounted only to a reduction in cash benefits. The 
law did not deny the Maldonados other welfare benefits. 
The court compared the Maldonados' position before and 
after exercising the right, and found it significant that the 
Maldonados continued to be eligible for TANF benefits at 
the same level they would have received in Puerto Rico 
(plus food stamps, medical benefits, and other assistance). 
Accordingly, the court concluded that 
 
       the lower benefits do not make new residents any 
       worse off because [they] receive exactly what they were 
       receiving or would have received in their state of prior 
       residence. Thus, the `penalty' that plaintiffs allege is 
       imposed on them for exercising their right to migrate 
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       interstate is not a `penalty' in the traditional sense of 
       the word--a lost benefit that the person would have 
       received had he not exercised some constitutional 
       right. Indeed, the plaintiffs here have lost no benefit 
       that they would have received had they not exercised 
       their right to migrate. . . . Thus, . . . [this court] finds 
       that Section 9(5)(ii)'s multi-tier durational residency 
       does not act as a penalty on plaintiffs' right to 
       interstate migration. 
 
Maldonado v. Houstoun, 177 F.R.D. 311, 331-32 (E.D. Pa. 
1997). 
 
Although the Supreme Court has never made clear the 
"amount of impact required to give rise to the compelling- 
state-interest test," Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 256-57, 
we are persuaded that the district court's "penalty" analysis 
in this case misconstrued the import of the relevant case 
law and used an improper comparison. Thus it erroneously 
concluded that Pennsylvania's two-tier welfare scheme does 
not amount to a penalty. First, similar to the Pennsylvania 
scheme under review here, two of the three state laws that 
the Court struck down in Shapiro offered "partial assistance 
. . . to some new residents and full assistance . . . to other 
new residents." See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 695; see also 
Zobel, 457 U.S. at 60-66 (holding unconstitutional state 
distribution of benefits to citizens on a sliding scale based 
on how long they have lived in the state); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, 
S10.7, at 703-04 (1997) ("The Supreme Court . . . has ruled 
that laws that do not totally deny benefits, but provide less 
to new arrivals are unconstitutional."). Thus, that 
Pennsylvania's scheme does not amount to a complete 
denial of cash benefits and that it provides recent 
immigrants with some amount of welfare benefits other 
than cash assistance is not dispositive. 
 
Second, and more importantly, as demonstrated by 
Shapiro, Maricopa County, and every equal protection case, 
the appropriate comparison is between those persons 
subject to the classification and those persons who are 
similarly situated but for the classification. Here, whether 
Pennsylvania's two-tier scheme amounts to a penalty must 
be determined by comparing new residents of Pennsylvania 
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and other similarly situated longer-term Pennsylvania 
residents, and not by comparing new residents of 
Pennsylvania and those of their former state. Once the 
Maldonados established bona fide residency in 
Pennsylvania, a comparison of residents of Puerto Rico with 
long-term Pennsylvania residents for equal protection 
purposes is neither sound nor logical; it is not a 
comparison between analogues. Residents of Puerto Rico 
have no claim to Pennsylvania welfare benefits or to equal 
protection under Pennsylvania's welfare laws until they 
move from Puerto Rico and establish a bona fide residence 
in Pennsylvania. Only once those persons reside in 
Pennsylvania is the classification applicable to them. 
 
Although the level of scrutiny to which durational 
residence requirements are subject may not be applied 
similarly in all contexts, that the appropriate comparison is 
between short- and longer-term Pennsylvania residents is 
well-established by the foregoing body of Supreme Court 
precedent. Moreover, our conclusion that the appropriate 
penalty analysis must compare shorter-term with longer- 
term Pennsylvania residents has been reached by 
numerous other federal and state courts that have 
considered this precise, or substantially similar, issue.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. See Roe v. Anderson, 966 F. Supp. 977, 984-85 (E.D. Cal. 1997), 
aff 'd, 134 F.3d 1400, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 
(U.S. July 9,1998) (No. 98-97); Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516, 
521 (E.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd, 26 F.3d 95 (9th Cir. 1994), judgment vacated 
as unripe, 513 U.S. 557 (1995) (per curiam); Westenfelder v. Ferguson, 
998 F. Supp. 146, 154 (D.R.I. 1998); Mitchell v. Steffen, 504 N.W.2d 198, 
201-02 (Minn. 1993); Sanchez v. Department of Human Services, ___ 
A.2d ___, A-466-97T1F, 1998 WL 391584, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. July 8, 1998); Brown v. Wing, 649 N.Y.S.2d 988, 995 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1996), aff 'd, 241 A.D.2d 956 (1997); see also Aumick v. Bane, 612 
N.Y.S.2d 766 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994); Robert C. Farrell, Classifications That 
Disadvantage Newcomers and the Problem of Equality, 28 U. Rich. L. 
Rev. 547, 609 (1994) (arguing that the "relevant comparison . . . [is] 
between newcomers and the established residents of the new state"); cf. 
Hicks v. Peters, ___ F. Supp. ___, No. 98C3247, 1998 WL 424176 (N.D. 
Ill. July 17, 1998) (declining to reach the issue of whether the Illinois 
durational residence statute imposes a penalty because it failed rational 
basis review). But cf. Jones v. Milwaukee County, 485 N.W.2d 21 (Wisc. 
1992) (finding that a 60 day durational residency requirement for general 
relief benefits is "substantially less onerous than the one year waiting 
period of Shapiro, . . . does not operate to penalize an individual's 
right 
to travel," and passes rational basis review). 
 
                                14 
  
From a constitutional standpoint, it is of no consequence 
that the Maldonados receive the same benefits that they 
would have received in Puerto Rico. Pennsylvania's two-tier 
welfare scheme penalizes the Maldonados for having 
exercised their right to travel by treating them significantly 
less favorably than other similarly situated longer-term 
Pennsylvania residents solely because they exercised that 
right more recently. 
 
It is well-established "that a State may not impose a 
penalty upon those who exercise a right guaranteed by the 
Constitution." Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 
(1965); accord Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 341. This, 
however, is exactly what Pennsylvania's two-tier durational 
residence scheme does. The $532 monthly reduction in the 
Maldonados' Pennsylvania benefits, based solely on their 
newly arrived status amounts to a 64% reduction in cash 
benefits and plainly penalizes them for having exercised 
their right to migrate into the state. 
 
This point is further reinforced by the holdings in Zobel, 
Hooper, and Soto-Lopez, where the Court held 
unconstitutional state benefit schemes that were unique to 
the states involved and which did not even exist in the 
plaintiffs' prior state of residence. See, e.g., Soto-Lopez, U.S. 
476 at 907, 911-12 ("Once [out-of-staters] establish bona 
fide residence in a State, they become the State's `own' and 
may not be discriminated against solely on the basis of [the 
date of] their arrival in the State. . . . For as long as [the 
State] chooses to offer [a benefit to its residents,] the 
Constitution requires that it do so without regard to [time 
of] residence.") (citations and internal quotations omitted); 
Hooper, 472 U.S. at 623 ("The State may not favor 
established residents over new residents based on the view 
that the State may take care of `its own,' if such is defined 
by prior residence."). Thus, from a constitutional viewpoint, 
the level of benefits available to the claimants in the state 
of their prior residence is irrelevant. What the Court found 
significant, however, was the difference in benefits provided 
to the claimants in the state of their new residence based 
solely on residential duration. Here too, newer residents, 
such as the Maldonados, plainly are "penalized" for having 
exercised their right to travel and migrate. 
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Thus, because Pennsylvania's durational residency 
requirement discriminates against newly arrived residents 
and penalizes their fundamental right to travel and migrate, 
we hold that Pennsylvania's welfare durational requirement 
is subject to strict scrutiny. Accordingly, to pass 
constitutional muster, the Commonwealth must show that 
the residential requirement is necessary to promote a 
compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to meet 
that end. Partly because the Commonwealth argues that 
the law should be reviewed under rational basis analysis, it 
has not presented anything even remotely resembling a 
compelling interest which would justify the law or shown 
that it is narrowly tailored to meet its asserted ends. 
 
First, one of the purposes of the statute articulated by 
the Commonwealth in the district court is to prevent 
Pennsylvania from becoming a "welfare magnet." The 
district court found this purpose clearly unconstitutional 
under Shapiro and its progeny. We agree, and it does not 
warrant additional discussion. See, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. 
at 629. Second, the Commonwealth's argument that the 
purpose of the durational residency requirement,"and 
indeed of Pennsylvania's entire assistance program, is to 
encourage work and self-sufficiency over dependency," is 
unconvincing. Although unquestionably the encouragement 
of self-sufficiency and work is a laudable and legitimate 
state goal, the Commonwealth has not demonstrated that 
this is a compelling interest or that a two-tier scheme is 
necessary to achieve that end. Even assuming arguendo 
that the interest is compelling, the scheme clearly is not 
narrowly drawn to achieve that goal and arguably, as the 
district court found and as applied by the Supreme Court, 
is not even rationally related to that purpose. 
 
For instance, the Commonwealth has not demonstrated 
why newly arrived residents are more in need of 
"encouragement" to join the work force than longer-term 
residents. If encouraging work truly were the goal, and 
reduced benefits during a waiting period accomplished this 
goal, all residents should be subject to a waiting period, not 
just new residents. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 637 ("A state 
purpose to encourage employment provides no rational 
basis for imposing a one-year waiting-period restriction on 
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new residents only."). Furthermore, the scheme does not 
encourage all new residents but only "encourages" those 
new residents who arrive from states that provide lower 
benefits than Pennsylvania. Moreover, and significantly, 
immigrants from abroad receive no encouragement for 
under Pennsylvania law they are eligible for the same 
benefits as long-term residents. Additionally, the scheme's 
irrationality is demonstrated by its application to persons 
who migrated to Pennsylvania while employed, but due to 
no fault of their own, such as layoffs or plant closings, 
became unemployed within their first twelve months in the 
state. The law's irrationality is further highlighted as the 
scheme applies even to those certified by the 
Commonwealth as being temporarily or permanently 
physically disabled or otherwise incapable of working, such 
as the Maldonados. There simply is no rational reason, let 
alone a compelling reason, to assume that only new 
residents from states that offer lesser benefits than 
Pennsylvania need "encouragement" to seek work and self- 
sufficiency. 
 
Amici curiae's proffered reason, that the scheme is 
justified by differing expectation and reliance interests--i.e., 
newcomers can more easily adjust to cuts in welfare 
benefits through their choice of communities and lifestyles 
than longer-term residents who expect to have, and rely on, 
the safety net of higher benefits--is not sufficiently 
compelling. Even if we assume that many newer residents 
can more easily adjust their lifestyles to reduced benefits 
than those with longstanding ties to a particular area, an 
assumption that is highly speculative, the Commonwealth 
again has not demonstrated a compelling interest that 
justifies what may amount to a greater than 60% reduction 
in an indigent family's cash benefits required to purchase 
many of life's necessities. 
 
Furthermore, the legislative scheme is not narrowly 
tailored to meet this purpose, as it does not take into 
account the myriad of differences in individual personal 
and financial situations. For example, most people who own 
homes, those who have fixed residential lease obligations, 
or those who have countless other longer-term financial 
obligations can less easily adjust to reduced benefits 
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compared to those persons without similar obligations. The 
Commonwealth could use means, need-based, or other 
testing to determine if a particular applicant actually can 
adjust to reduced welfare benefits. Under any of numerous 
scenarios, it is likely that an eleven-month resident of 
Pennsylvania who unexpectedly finds herself in need of 
welfare benefits will find it just as difficult to survive on 
reduced benefits as will a twelve-month resident. Amici 
curiae have presented no compelling reason to assume that 
all newer residents, and only newer residents, are more 
able to easily adjust to and survive on reduced welfare 
benefits, nor have they demonstrated that the scheme is 
narrowly tailored to affect only those able to adjust to and 
survive on reduced welfare benefits. Thus, it is obvious that 
the Commonwealth (and Amici) has failed to demonstrate 
that its twelve-month durational residency requirement is 
necessary to promote a compelling state interest, or that 
the legislation is narrowly drawn to meet its stated 
objections. 
 
We agree with the district court that there is no 
constitutional right to welfare benefits, Dandridge v. 
Williams, 98 U.S. 471, 485 (1970), and none is claimed. We 
are also aware of a state's legitimate interest in preserving 
public funds. When, however, a state makes welfare 
benefits available for its indigent, Shapiro and Maricopa 
County make it clear that the preservation of the public fisc 
may not be achieved by an invidious distinction between 
classes of its citizens. 
 
We are mindful, however, as explained by the district 
court, that the opinions in several Supreme Court cases 
decided since Shapiro and Maricopa County may call into 
question the vitality of strict scrutiny review of laws that 
burden the fundamental right to interstate travel and 
migration. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has 
periodically admonished lower federal courts, and has 
recently "reaffirm[ed] its rule that `if a precedent of th[e 
Supreme] Court has direct application in a case, yet 
appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of 
decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case 
which directly controls, leaving to th[e Supreme] Court the 
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.' " See Agostini v. 
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Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2017 (1997) (quoting Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 
484 (1989)). Because Shapiro and Maricopa County have 
never been overruled by the Court, we follow the Court's 
directive and conclude that they dictate the result of this 
case.9 We note, however, that our opinion is in no way 
meant to pass judgment on the wisdom or desirability of 
the Pennsylvania legislature's attempt at welfare reform. 
 
III. 
 
In conclusion, we affirm the district court's order that the 
Maldonados have shown that they were likely to succeed in 
proving that Commonwealth's twelve-month durational 
residence requirement is unconstitutional. Thus, the court's 
grant of a preliminary injunction was not an abuse of 
discretion. We conclude, however, that the court 
erroneously subjected the law to rational basis analysis 
instead of the requisite strict scrutiny. The Commonwealth 
has not demonstrated that the scheme is necessary to 
promote a compelling state interest, or that it is narrowly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. On appeal, the Maldonados once again argue that Section 9(5)(ii) 
violates the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of Article IV and the 
Fourteenth Amendment. As shown by the almost complete lack of 
citation to authority in their brief, this argument is almost completely 
without merit. But see Zobel, 457 U.S. at 71-81 (O'Connor, J. 
concurring) (finding the right to travel rooted in the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause). The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted 
Article IV, S2--the Privileges and Immunities Clause--to be a limit on the 
ability of a state to discriminate against out-of-state residents. The 
Clause, "in effect, prevents a State from discriminating against citizens 
of other States in favor of its own." Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 
307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939). As a necessary prerequisite for the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause to apply, it must be shown that a state 
discriminated against a citizen of another state. See, e.g, United Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor and Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 
218 (1984); Zobel, 457 U.S. at 59 n.5. Here, by contrast, the 
Pennsylvania statute is applicable only to bonafide Pennsylvania-state 
residents and does not discriminate against nonresidents in any way. 
The only way to fall under the challenged scheme is to first become a 
resident of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Accordingly, the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause has no application to the issues 
presented by this appeal. 
 
                                19 
  
tailored to accomplish its stated goal. Accordingly, we hold 
that Pennsylvania's two-tier durational residency 
requirement for welfare benefits is unconstitutional as it is 
based solely on a citizen's length of residing in the state; 
the scheme impermissibly penalizes citizens who have 
exercised their fundamental right to travel and migrate 
interstate, and thus violates the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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